Reflections following my Good Governance Academy webinar on governance, Integrated Assurance, and business survivability.
During my recent webinar with the Good Governance Academy, we discussed why organizations continue to experience significant operational failures despite having established governance structures, mature risk management programs, and substantial investments in security. This is a question I have spent much of my career examining, and it was one of the motivations behind my development of Integrated Assurance®.
The discussion drew on my book, Relevant Impact: A Field Guide to Integrated Assurance, and the experiences that have shaped my thinking about business survivability. I have worked with organizations that maintain extensive control environments and employ highly capable professionals across their security, risk, compliance, and audit functions. Many of these organizations perform well against recognized frameworks and consistently satisfy their regulatory obligations. However, when confronted with a significant disruption, some discover that their ability to sustain business operations is considerably less mature than their governance reporting would suggest.
I believe much of this comes from how we have traditionally organized and evaluated governance. We have developed sophisticated methods for assessing individual controls and documenting risk, but we have been less successful at understanding how the capabilities those controls support contribute to the operation of the business. As a result, leadership can receive credible assurance from multiple functions without obtaining a complete understanding of the organization's ability to withstand a significant interruption.
Understanding What Governance Actually Accomplishes
I have no particular objection to traditional governance models. They establish necessary responsibilities and provide mechanisms for holding management accountable. The problem develops when organizations begin treating the successful execution of governance activities as evidence that the business is adequately protected.
An organization might complete its annual audits, maintain an extensive risk register, and report favorable compliance results to its board. Those results may be entirely accurate within the scope of the assessments performed. What they cannot necessarily establish is whether the organization could continue operating if a critical technology provider became unavailable or if a major business process experienced a prolonged interruption.
This becomes particularly important when considering the dependencies between business functions. Technology recovery procedures may be well documented, but the business processes that depend on those systems may require resources that are not addressed within the recovery plan. The organization may have tested the restoration of its infrastructure without determining whether it can continue fulfilling customer commitments or generating sufficient revenue during an extended disruption.
I have increasingly come to view this as a problem of structural vulnerability. The organization may have effective controls throughout its operating environment while remaining exposed through dependencies that have not been adequately understood. These dependencies often develop gradually as businesses introduce new technologies or reorganize their operations. As I explored in Complexity Doesn't Arrive Overnight, individual operational decisions can gradually produce an organization that functions quite differently from the one leadership believes it is managing.
Business survivability requires a broader understanding of these relationships. The effectiveness of a recovery capability must be considered in relation to the business activities it supports and the financial consequences of their interruption. Restoring technology within an established recovery window may satisfy a technical objective while leaving the organization exposed to losses that threaten its future viability.
The Questions Boards Should Be Asking
During the webinar, we spent considerable time discussing whether boards are receiving the information necessary to understand these vulnerabilities. My concern is that governance reporting frequently emphasizes the status of individual risks and controls without providing directors with sufficient context about the business capabilities being protected.
I believe directors should understand which operational processes are essential to the organization's continued viability and how those processes depend on technology, personnel, suppliers, and other resources. This understanding should extend to the consequences of losing a critical dependency and the options available to management if that occurs.
These are reasonable business questions, although obtaining reliable answers can be surprisingly difficult. Many organizations have invested heavily in mapping their technology environments without developing an equivalent understanding of how their business processes depend on those technologies. Information about suppliers may reside within procurement, while operational recovery capabilities are managed elsewhere. Each function maintains information relevant to its responsibilities, but the relationships between those responsibilities are not always apparent to leadership. I explored this loss of organizational visibility in The Business You Built Is Not Always the Business You Run.
The growing dependence on external service providers makes this problem more significant. Organizations have outsourced substantial portions of their technology and operational capabilities, often with the expectation that contractual obligations and supplier certifications provide adequate protection. These arrangements may be commercially appropriate, but they do not eliminate the organization's exposure to the consequences of supplier failure.
I often make the point that an organization can outsource control, but it cannot outsource assurance. A supplier's compliance certification may demonstrate that certain controls have been assessed, but management must still determine whether the supplier's capabilities are sufficient to support the organization's requirements. Where a critical dependency has no practical alternative, the board should understand the implications of that exposure and the decisions management has made in accepting it.
Why Organizational Silos Continue to Create Risk
The fragmentation of governance and assurance activities was one of the principal reasons I developed Integrated Assurance. Throughout my career, I have encountered organizations where security, compliance, risk management, and internal audit each perform their responsibilities competently while important relationships between business risks remain poorly understood.
This is partly a consequence of how these functions have evolved. Each has developed its own methodologies and reporting requirements, generally with an emphasis on demonstrating effectiveness within its assigned area of responsibility. The information produced may be accurate and useful, but its relevance to the broader organization depends on whether it can be connected to the business objectives those functions collectively support.
Consider how an organization might evaluate a critical business system. The cybersecurity team may have evidence that the system is adequately protected, while the operations team maintains a tested recovery procedure. Internal audit may have independently assessed selected controls and found them effective. The business owner, however, may depend on several additional services that have not been included in those assessments. The organization has obtained assurance about individual components without establishing whether the complete business process can continue operating during a disruption.
My development of Integrated Assurance was driven by the limitations I observed in how organizations connect governance, risk management, security, and assurance to their business objectives. Established governance models provide useful structures for assigning responsibilities and maintaining independent oversight, but Integrated Assurance addresses a broader problem involving the organization's ability to understand and manage the relationships between its operating capabilities.
Integrated Assurance is an enterprise operating model that connects business objectives with the capabilities, dependencies, risks, and controls necessary to achieve them. It preserves individual accountability and the independence of assurance functions while establishing a common understanding of how their activities affect the business. Management can then evaluate organizational risk in the context of operational performance and business survivability, supported by evidence that reflects how the organization actually operates.
It is important to note that Integrated Assurance was developed independently of the Institute of Internal Auditors' Three Lines Model and is neither an adaptation nor an extension of that model. The IIA model primarily addresses the roles and responsibilities associated with governance and assurance, while Integrated Assurance examines the organization as an interconnected operating environment. Its purpose extends beyond coordinating assurance functions to understanding whether the organization's collective capabilities are sufficient to achieve its objectives and sustain operations.
The Integrated Assurance Maturity Model (IAMM®) provides a structured means of evaluating how effectively these capabilities are connected across the enterprise. It helps identify where fragmented responsibilities or incomplete operational understanding may be limiting the organization's ability to manage risk and maintain confidence in its business capabilities.
Making Risk Management Useful to the Business
Another issue we explored was the limited influence that risk management sometimes has on business decisions. Organizations have become reasonably proficient at identifying and documenting risks, although the information produced through those activities does not always influence how resources are allocated or how strategic opportunities are evaluated.
I believe risk management becomes more valuable when it helps leadership understand the consequences of its decisions. An organization considering a major technology investment should be able to evaluate how that investment affects its operating dependencies and whether existing capabilities are sufficient to support the change. The same considerations apply when entering new markets or expanding relationships with external providers.
There is an important relationship between this understanding and the organization's willingness to accept risk. Businesses cannot eliminate uncertainty, nor should that be their objective. Management needs sufficient confidence in the organization's capabilities to pursue opportunities while remaining accountable for the consequences of its decisions.
This is where assurance should contribute directly to business strategy. If leadership understands the effectiveness of the capabilities supporting a particular activity, it can make more informed decisions about the risks associated with that activity. Conversely, where assurance reveals weaknesses that could threaten critical operations, management has a basis for determining whether additional investment is necessary.
Accountability must remain clear throughout this process. Integrated Assurance does not transfer responsibility for business decisions to security or risk management functions. Those functions provide information and expertise, but the business owner remains responsible for understanding the operational consequences and determining how the associated risks should be managed.
Operational Trust and the Evidence Behind Assurance
In Relevant Impact, I discuss trust as an operational capability and introduce the concept of trust velocity. My interest in this subject developed from observing how organizations make decisions when the information available is incomplete and the consequences of delay are significant.
I have since expanded this thinking through Operational Trust, which examines the assumptions organizations make about the systems, people, information, and external providers on which their operations depend. These assumptions are necessary for the business to function, although they can become sources of vulnerability when the evidence supporting them is no longer reliable.
Trust velocity concerns the time required to establish sufficient confidence to make and execute a decision. An organization with established accountability and reliable operational information is generally better positioned to respond under pressure because its leadership does not need to determine responsibilities or establish decision-making procedures during the incident.
I believe these characteristics can be evaluated through realistic exercises and observations of operational performance. We can examine how quickly problems are recognized and escalated, whether decisions are made by individuals with appropriate authority, and how effectively the organization executes its response. These observations provide a more useful understanding of organizational readiness than general statements about the strength of its culture.
The same principle applies to board reporting. I have seen organizations produce extensive dashboards that communicate favorable performance across numerous governance and control activities. The difficulty is determining whether those indicators provide meaningful evidence about the organization's ability to sustain critical operations.
I would rather provide a board with five indicators that reflect the effectiveness of essential business capabilities than fifty measures that primarily demonstrate the completion of governance activities. The selection of those indicators should be informed by an understanding of the organization's operating model and the consequences of losing the capabilities on which it depends.
Cybersecurity and AI Within the Business Operating Model
Cybersecurity illustrates many of the problems associated with treating risk as a responsibility confined to a particular function. Although cyber incidents frequently originate within technology environments, the consequences can extend into virtually every aspect of business operations.
A ransomware incident may prevent an organization from processing transactions or fulfilling customer obligations. The technical recovery may proceed according to plan, but the interruption can create financial consequences that continue long after the affected systems have been restored. These consequences should be considered when determining the organization's recovery requirements and evaluating whether its existing capabilities are sufficient. This relationship between security, financial exposure, and recovery is something I have also examined in Security, Liability, and Recovery as a Risk Value Chain.
I do not expect board members to understand the technical details of cybersecurity controls. I do expect them to understand the business consequences of losing critical technology capabilities and to ensure that management has made informed decisions about the associated risks.
Artificial intelligence introduces further complexity because organizations are increasingly incorporating systems capable of influencing decisions and performing activities that previously required human judgment. The risks associated with these systems depend heavily on how they are used and the authority they have been given.
An AI system that provides recommendations for human consideration presents different governance concerns from one authorized to execute transactions or modify operational processes independently. As organizations expand the use of autonomous systems, they need to understand how those systems interact with existing business capabilities and whether their established control mechanisms remain effective.
I believe the starting point for AI governance should be the business activities being affected. Management needs to understand the decisions and processes in which AI participates, the authority delegated to those systems, and the means available to identify behavior that falls outside established expectations. My work on AI and Organizational Risk examines how these technologies change the location and nature of business decisions, particularly when AI capabilities are introduced through existing suppliers and software platforms.
Integrated Assurance provides a useful approach because these considerations can be evaluated within the organization's existing governance responsibilities. Creating entirely separate AI governance structures risks introducing additional fragmentation into an environment where the relationships between existing functions may already be poorly understood.
Assurance Must Reflect the Current Operating Environment
The pace of technological and operational change also raises questions about the continued reliance on periodic assurance activities. Traditional audits remain valuable, particularly where independent evaluation is required, but the conclusions reached during an assessment can become less relevant as the organization changes.
A control evaluated six months ago may have been effective at the time of the assessment. Since then, the organization may have modified the technology supporting the control or introduced new business processes that depend on it. The original assurance conclusion may remain part of the organization's reporting even though the circumstances supporting it have materially changed.
I believe organizations need to distinguish between the frequency of audits and the continuity of assurance. There is little value in attempting to assess every control continuously, particularly when many have limited significance to the organization's ability to operate. A more practical approach begins with identifying critical business capabilities and determining which controls and dependencies require ongoing attention.
The objective should be to provide management with information that can influence decisions while there is still an opportunity to address the underlying issue. A control weakness affecting a minor administrative process may be appropriately managed through routine procedures. A similar weakness affecting a capability essential to revenue generation may require more immediate attention because of its potential consequences.
This approach also provides a more useful basis for determining what information should reach the board. Directors should receive sufficient evidence to understand material changes in the organization's exposure without becoming responsible for managing the details of individual controls. I examined the broader implications of this evolution in The Risk Management Lifecycle Outgrew Cybersecurity.
Demonstrating Organizational Readiness
During the webinar, we also discussed the importance of organizational culture and whether established procedures provide reliable evidence of readiness. I have participated in exercises where organizations possessed comprehensive incident response plans but struggled when participants were required to make decisions under pressure.
In some cases, individuals were uncertain about their authority or did not understand when an issue required escalation. These problems were not necessarily the result of inadequate documentation. They reflected weaknesses in the working relationships and decision-making practices required to execute the documented procedures.
I believe readiness develops through experience, particularly when exercises require business leadership and operational teams to work through circumstances that challenge their normal assumptions. The value of these activities comes from observing how the organization actually responds and identifying where established responsibilities or capabilities prove insufficient.
This understanding is particularly important because significant disruptions rarely remain confined to the function where they originate. An incident involving technology may quickly require decisions about financial commitments or the continuation of essential services. The effectiveness of the response depends on whether the organization has developed the relationships and capabilities necessary to coordinate those decisions.
The same considerations influence how I approach resilience. Recovery plans generally concentrate on restoring established capabilities, which is appropriate for many operational disruptions. However, returning to the previous operating state may also restore the conditions that contributed to the incident.
I believe organizations need to examine how their operating capabilities perform under changing conditions and whether those capabilities can be adapted when established assumptions no longer hold. This requires management to consider the effectiveness of recovery arrangements within the broader business operating model and to understand whether restoring an individual capability will produce the intended business outcome.
Business survivability extends beyond the restoration of established operations by considering whether the organization can remain commercially viable throughout the disruption and its aftermath. A technically successful recovery may be insufficient if the business has experienced consequences that permanently affect its ability to operate.
Reconsidering the Purpose of Governance
The broader argument I wanted to convey during the Good Governance Academy webinar concerns how we determine whether governance is effective. Organizations have invested substantial resources in developing governance structures and assurance capabilities, often in response to legitimate regulatory and operational requirements. Those investments should contribute to a better understanding of the business and improve management's ability to make informed decisions.
I believe boards need to examine that contribution more closely. The completion of governance activities provides evidence that established responsibilities are being performed, but directors also need to understand whether those activities are improving the organization's ability to sustain its operations.
This becomes increasingly important as businesses adopt new technologies and develop more complex relationships with external providers. Changes to the operating model can introduce dependencies that are difficult to recognize through conventional reporting, particularly when responsibility for evaluating those dependencies is distributed across multiple functions.
My work on Integrated Assurance began with the recognition that these organizational divisions were preventing leadership from obtaining a complete understanding of risk. The development of the approach was informed by years of working with organizations where significant investments in security and governance had not produced the level of operational confidence that management expected.
Over time, I came to recognize business survivability as the broader objective toward which those investments should contribute. This perspective has influenced how I evaluate governance and the relationship between assurance activities and business performance.
The conclusion I have reached is that silos are the problem, Integrated Assurance is the operating model, and business survivability is the goal. I believe this provides a useful basis for reconsidering what boards should expect from governance and how organizations should evaluate the effectiveness of the capabilities they have established.
Ultimately, the value of governance should be reflected in the quality of the decisions it supports and the organization's demonstrated ability to sustain itself. That requires leadership to understand the business as an interconnected operating system and to maintain sufficient assurance that its critical capabilities can continue functioning when the conditions under which they were designed inevitably change.
