A shipment leaves a warehouse after an employee receives what appears to be a legitimate release instruction. The documentation is in order, the carrier information matches the details provided, and the goods are released through the normal process. The problem becomes apparent later, when the customer reports that the shipment never arrived. The instructions were fraudulent, and the goods were transferred to someone who had no authority to receive them. The warehouse may have followed its established procedures, but the business has suffered a loss that several parties may now dispute responsibility for.
This is the type of scenario examined in Aon's recent analysis of cyber risks affecting cargo movement. The article considers how compromised communications and manipulated shipping instructions can result in physical losses, along with the insurance complications that arise when those losses don't fit neatly within established coverage arrangements. I find the analysis particularly interesting because it illustrates a problem I've encountered throughout my career in enterprise security architecture. Organizations can demonstrate that individual systems meet their security requirements without necessarily establishing that the business activities relying on those systems are adequately protected.
The distinction matters because a cybersecurity incident doesn't have to result in an obvious technology failure to cause significant damage. An attacker may be able to influence information used in an otherwise legitimate transaction, allowing employees to complete an unauthorized activity while believing they are following established procedures. The resulting loss occurs through the business process, and understanding how it happened requires examining the relationships between the systems, people and organizations involved.
The Business Transaction Is Where the Loss Occurs
The cargo diversion example illustrates how an attacker can influence a business transaction without compromising every system involved. Fraudulent instructions may be introduced through a compromised account or by impersonating a legitimate party. Once those instructions enter the normal process, employees may have little reason to question them unless the organization has established a reliable means of independent verification. The transaction can proceed through authorized systems and established procedures while producing an outcome the business never intended.
The difficulty increases when several companies participate in the same transaction. A shipper may engage a freight broker, the broker may arrange transportation through a carrier, and a warehouse may release the goods based on instructions received through a logistics platform. Each organization has responsibilities for its portion of the activity, but the transaction depends on information moving between parties that don't necessarily operate under the same controls. When a shipment is diverted, determining which party should have identified the fraudulent instructions can become as difficult as establishing how the fraud occurred.
Aon describes how these incidents can create disputes involving carrier verification and responsibility for releasing goods. Those questions become particularly important when determining contractual liability and insurance coverage. The fact that an employee followed an established procedure may help explain what happened, but it doesn't necessarily establish whether the procedure provided adequate protection against manipulated information.
The FBI's June 2026 warning about cyber-enabled cargo theft describes similar schemes involving compromised business accounts and criminals impersonating legitimate carriers. The FBI reported that estimated cargo theft losses across the United States and Canada reached nearly $725 million in 2025, although that figure includes cargo theft more broadly and shouldn't be attributed entirely to cyber-enabled schemes. The warning nevertheless demonstrates how criminals exploit weaknesses in the information and verification processes that businesses rely on to authorize the movement of goods.
For organizations evaluating their cybersecurity controls, these incidents raise questions that extend beyond whether employees have appropriate access to systems. The business needs to understand how an important transaction is authorized and what evidence establishes that the instructions supporting it can be trusted. Authentication may establish that a person is permitted to use a system, but the integrity of the transaction depends on whether the information being acted upon is legitimate.
What Our Security Assessments May Be Missing
Cybersecurity programs have become increasingly capable of evaluating technical controls. Organizations can identify vulnerabilities, examine configurations, monitor access and measure compliance against established standards. These activities provide useful information about the condition of the technology environment, but problems arise when that evidence is treated as sufficient assurance about the business processes supported by the technology.
Consider the tracking systems used in transportation. Aon discusses how compromised GPS or telematics information can interfere with an organization's ability to determine where a shipment is located. Employees may continue receiving information from the platform and making operational decisions based on what appears to be reliable data. If the information has been manipulated, the business may not recognize that something is wrong until the opportunity to intervene has passed. The application may remain available throughout the incident, and employees may continue accessing it normally, while the information supporting their decisions is no longer trustworthy.
I've encountered similar problems in financial systems and other environments where organizations depend on information exchanged between applications. Security teams may have confidence in the controls protecting individual systems while having limited understanding of how an error or manipulation in one system affects decisions elsewhere. This becomes particularly difficult when information crosses organizational boundaries because the company may have strong controls over its own environment while depending on information supplied by providers whose internal processes it cannot directly evaluate.
A conventional control assessment can establish that access restrictions are configured appropriately or that a system is monitored for suspicious activity. It may provide considerably less information about whether the organization would recognize manipulated instructions before completing an important transaction. The difference becomes apparent when the assessment is considered from the perspective of the business activity rather than the technology supporting it. The controls remain necessary, but their effectiveness needs to be evaluated against the consequences they are intended to prevent.
Dependencies Change as Businesses Evolve
Aon also examines the consequences of interruptions affecting logistics platforms and other external services. A company may be unable to book shipments, release cargo or obtain the information needed to manage inventory because a provider's systems are unavailable. The affected company may have experienced no compromise of its own environment, and its facilities and employees may be ready to operate. The interruption occurs because an external service needed to complete an essential activity is no longer accessible.
These relationships are common throughout business, but their importance can change considerably over time. A company may initially adopt a logistics platform to improve efficiency and reduce administrative work. As employees become accustomed to the service, manual procedures are used less frequently and other processes are adapted around the platform. Eventually, the organization may find that it cannot process normal transaction volumes without the service, even though the original decision to adopt it was made as a relatively modest operational improvement.
I've described this accumulation of unexamined assumptions as decision debt. The business continues operating under decisions made at an earlier point without necessarily reconsidering whether the circumstances supporting those decisions remain valid. The original dependency may have been understood, but its consequences change as the organization adapts around it. When the service eventually fails, leadership may discover that the alternatives described in its recovery plans are no longer practical or that the organization has become dependent on capabilities it cannot readily replace.
This is one reason I believe conventional vendor assessments provide only part of the information leadership needs. A supplier may have appropriate security certifications and contractual commitments, but those assurances don't establish whether the customer can continue operating if the service becomes unavailable. Aon's analysis of third-party cyber risk as a balance sheet issue makes a related point about the financial consequences of provider failures. Those consequences can substantially exceed the value of the service being purchased, while contractual remedies may provide only limited compensation.
The importance of a provider therefore needs to be understood in relation to the business activities it supports. A relatively inexpensive service may be essential to generating revenue or meeting contractual obligations, and the consequences of losing access may have little relationship to the value of the contract. Organizations need to reconsider these dependencies as their operations change, particularly when services that were originally adopted for convenience become necessary to sustain essential activities.
Insurance Doesn't Always Respond as Expected
The insurance questions raised by Aon's analysis are particularly interesting because similar financial consequences can arise from circumstances that are treated differently under insurance policies. A shipment may be physically lost after being released on fraudulent instructions, but whether the loss is covered can depend on how the event is classified and the language of the applicable policy. Cargo insurance, crime coverage and cyber insurance may each be relevant to different aspects of the incident without necessarily providing coverage for the particular loss.
The situation becomes more complicated when several organizations are involved. The shipper, broker, carrier and warehouse may have different contractual responsibilities and insurance arrangements. Establishing which party is responsible for the loss can become part of determining which policy, if any, should respond. The investigation may therefore need to examine the original fraudulent instructions and the obligations of each participant before the insurance implications can be understood.
Connected operational equipment introduces similar questions. A cyber incident affecting refrigeration systems could result in spoiled inventory, while a disruption to automated cargo handling equipment could prevent a facility from operating. The business may experience physical or financial consequences originating from a technology failure, with coverage depending on the circumstances and the terms of its insurance arrangements. Aon's analysis of cyber disruption in retail supply chains examines related concerns involving inventory spoilage and business interruption, including how physical damage requirements and cyber exclusions can influence whether coverage responds.
I believe businesses need a better understanding of these exposures before purchasing insurance. The conventional approach often begins with the types of policies available and the limits the organization wants to purchase. That can leave important questions unanswered about how a loss might actually occur and whether the circumstances would satisfy the conditions of the coverage being considered.
A company may believe it has transferred a particular risk because it maintains several forms of insurance. The assumptions supporting that belief may never have been examined against a realistic incident involving its operations. A cyber insurance policy might respond to one type of technology-related interruption while another policy addresses certain physical losses, but the organization needs to understand the conditions under which each form of protection applies.
I've argued that cyber insurers are becoming increasingly influential in determining the security practices expected of businesses. Their underwriting requirements can encourage organizations to improve controls and demonstrate that those controls are working. The limitation is that underwriting is primarily concerned with evaluating the insurer's exposure, which may not encompass every consequence that could threaten the business. Leadership needs to understand the financial losses the organization could reasonably experience and determine which of those losses can be transferred through insurance. That discussion requires the involvement of people who understand how the business operates because the circumstances of a loss often matter as much as its financial magnitude.
What the Evidence Actually Demonstrates
Aon recommends using realistic scenarios to examine operational exposure and the insurance implications of an incident. The firm also identifies weaknesses in preparedness among transportation and logistics organizations assessed through its Cyber Quotient Evaluation, reporting that 38% don't conduct sufficient cyber tabletop exercises and 29% lack annual penetration testing. Those findings reflect Aon's assessed organizations rather than the transportation industry as a whole, but they raise a useful question about how businesses establish confidence in their controls and recovery arrangements.
A tabletop exercise can provide an opportunity to examine the decisions employees would make when information becomes unreliable or an essential service is unavailable. For the cargo diversion scenario, I would want to know how changes in carrier or delivery instructions are verified and whether the process would identify an unauthorized change before the shipment is released. I would also want to understand how quickly the business could recognize that goods had been diverted and what options would remain available at that point. Those questions help establish whether the controls protecting the transaction are capable of preventing or limiting the financial consequences.
For an outage affecting a logistics provider, the exercise should examine whether the business can continue processing essential transactions. If alternative procedures exist, they need to be evaluated against the volume of activity the organization must sustain. A documented workaround may provide little practical value if employees haven't used it for years or if it cannot support the level of operations necessary to meet customer obligations.
The results should provide evidence that informs business decisions. If the organization discovers that a critical transaction depends on information it cannot independently verify, leadership has a basis for determining whether additional controls are necessary. If a service interruption would prevent the business from operating for several days, the organization can evaluate whether that exposure is acceptable or whether alternative arrangements are justified.
This is the purpose I intended for Integrated Assurance. Organizations need to connect the risks associated with their operations to the controls intended to manage those risks and maintain evidence about whether the arrangements are effective. The information should help leadership make decisions about the business while providing a more reliable foundation for discussions with insurers and other parties who need confidence in how the organization manages its exposure.
Recovery Needs to Be Considered in Business Terms
The transportation examples illustrate why restoring technology doesn't necessarily resolve the consequences of an incident. A shipment that has been diverted may never be recovered, inventory damaged by a refrigeration failure may have to be discarded, and customers affected by delayed deliveries may have made alternative arrangements before normal operations resume. The business can restore its systems and continue experiencing the financial consequences of the interruption.
This is a concern I've been developing through my work on Business Survivability. Organizations often establish recovery objectives around the availability of technology without fully examining how an interruption affects the activities that generate revenue or sustain essential obligations. A logistics company may have a recovery objective for its transportation management platform, but that objective doesn't necessarily explain how long customers can tolerate delayed shipments or how much inventory can remain unavailable before the consequences become financially serious.
Those questions require an understanding of the business that goes beyond the technical recovery plan. Insurance may provide compensation for qualifying losses, but the organization still needs to manage the interruption while recovery takes place. Claims may require investigation, and the amount ultimately recovered may differ from the financial consequences experienced by the business. The ability to continue essential activities therefore depends on operational arrangements that need to be established before the incident occurs.
For many businesses, the most significant weakness may not be the absence of a particular security control. It may be an operational dependency that has become essential without anyone recognizing how difficult it would be to replace during a disruption. Evaluating that exposure requires understanding how the business has changed and whether its existing recovery assumptions remain reasonable.
Understanding the Business Before Evaluating the Risk
Although Aon's analysis focuses on transportation and logistics, the underlying issues apply to organizations across industries. Businesses rely on information to authorize transactions and on external services to perform activities that were once managed internally. Those arrangements have improved efficiency, but they have also created relationships that can be difficult to understand when something goes wrong.
Cybersecurity assessments provide important information about the controls protecting these environments, but their value is limited when the results aren't connected to the business activities that depend on those controls. I've spent much of my career trying to close that gap. The difficulty is rarely a complete absence of information. Organizations usually have considerable knowledge distributed across security, technology, operations, finance and procurement. The problem is that the information isn't consistently brought together when decisions are made about exposure and acceptable risk.
Integrated Assurance is the operating model I've developed to address that problem. It allows organizations to consider how decisions made in one part of the business affect other activities and whether the controls intended to manage those consequences are supported by evidence. For the scenarios described by Aon, I would begin with the business transaction or operational activity that could produce a material loss. Understanding how that activity is authorized and which external services it depends on provides a basis for evaluating the controls and recovery arrangements already in place.
That examination may reveal weaknesses that aren't apparent from conventional cybersecurity assessments. It may also identify areas where existing controls are effective and additional investment would provide limited value. The same information can support a more meaningful insurance discussion because the organization can explain how losses might occur and what arrangements it has established to manage their consequences.
What I find useful about Aon's analysis is that it follows cyber risk into the business activities where the consequences are experienced. The compromised instruction matters because goods are released to the wrong party. The unavailable logistics platform matters because shipments cannot move. The insurance question arises because the financial consequences may not fit the assumptions under which coverage was purchased.
Business Survivability depends on leadership recognizing these relationships and maintaining an understanding of how the organization would operate if an essential activity were interrupted. That understanding should influence decisions about security controls, recovery capabilities and financial protection as the business changes. The organization ultimately carries the consequences of those decisions, regardless of which technology provider or insurance policy is involved, and it needs sufficient evidence to understand the exposure it has accepted before an incident forces the issue.